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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has permeated the corporate governance landscape. Parties to
contracts frequently choose to adhere to contractual language obligating them
to resolve their disputes in front of a neutral arbitrator and outside of the
courtroom.1 An increasingly popular alternative dispute resolution
mechanism, mandatory arbitration clauses are now springing up in more
complex forms of contract: corporate bylaws and articles of incorporation. 2
These clauses bind a corporation's owners (its shareholders) to arbitration
proceedings for resolution of their derivative claims against corporate
management-one of the principal methods of upholding the corporate
governance structure. 3 Because shareholders are being barred from the secure
confines of Delaware jurisprudence as a result, mandatory arbitration clauses
are causing a revolution in shareholder derivative suits, along with the
fundamentals of Delaware corporate law.
The popularity of mandatory arbitration provisions is evidenced by the
U.S. Supreme Court's endorsement of this alternative dispute mechanism
within the corporate context. The recent 5-4 Supreme Court decision AT&T
J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2013; B.S.,
B.A., Saint Louis University, 2009. The author would like to thank professors Paul Rose
and Steven M. Davidoff for their interest and support in the topic; and her parents, John J.
Farinacci and Joanne G. Farinacci for their never-ending support and guidance.
I The U.S. Supreme Court formally recognized the enforceability of class arbitration
proceedings in Stolt-Neilson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775
(2010), by recognizing that a party is compelled to class arbitration when "there is a
contractual basis for concluding the party agreed to do so." See also Annual Review of
Developments in Business and Corporate Litigation, in 1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON BusfNEss AND CORPORATE LITIGATION 232, 234-36 (2011).
2 Christos Ravanides, Arbitration Clauses in Public Company Charters: An
Expansion of the ADR Elysian Fields or a Descent into Hades?, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
371, 378 (2009) ("Arbitration is no longer a mere 'legal possibility,' but literally in the
wings for public shareholders.").
3 Andrew J. Sockol, A Natural Evolution: Compulsory Arbitration of Shareholder
Derivative Suits in Publicly Traded Corporations, 77 TUL. L. REv. 1095, 1096 (2003).
"Mandatory" arbitration clauses refer to contractual provisions that deem arbitration the
exclusive remedy for resolving disputes, as opposed to "voluntary" arbitration provisions
which allow shareholders to elect litigation in court. Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory
Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 283 (2002).
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Mobility v. Concepcion4 held that a California state law restricting the ability
of corporations to use mandatory arbitration agreements for resolving
consumer and employment contract disputes was preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA). 5 In AT&T, plaintiff-consumers argued that the
contracts they entered into for cellular phone services, which contained a
clause requiring arbitration of all customer class-action disputes, violated a
California state rule barring all class-action waivers in adhesion contracts. 6
The Supreme Court disagreed, and declared the California law invalid under
the FAA. 7 Stressing that "[t]he principal purpose of the FAA is to ensure that
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms," the
Court's decision heightened the importance of the FAA within the context of
corporate contracts.8
AT&T Mobility affects the rights of consumers and employees-parties
who are most likely to bring suit in the form of a class action-and addresses
mandatory arbitration clauses in the context of their increasingly frequent use
within consumer and employment contracts. On the other hand, mandatory
4 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011).
5 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). See also Joseph C. Barsalona II,
Recent Development: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion et ux., 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 273, 273 (2012) (noting the Supreme Court's reluctance to deviate from the
FAA's dual objectives to enforce private contracts and facilitate streamlined dispute
resolution processes).
6 AT&T Mobility, 1315 S. Ct. at 1744-45. The cell phone contract's arbitration
clause required all consumer claims to be brought "in the parties' individual capacity, and
not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding."
Id. at 1744 (internal citation omitted).
7 Id. at 1750. The Court's ruling in AT&T reflects its previously noted stance
regarding the applicability of the FAA to state law in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 16 (1984). In Southland, the Court formally recognized a "national policy
favoring arbitration" and ruled that the federal statutory law of the FAA preempts any
state law that frustrates the FAA's objectives by requiring a judicial forum to resolve
claims. Id. at 10.
8AT&T Mobility, 1315 S. Ct. at 1748. (internal citation omitted). See also
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (finding an arbitration
provision within a consumer's credit card agreement enforceable under the FAA, even
though the Credit Repair Organizations Act is silent on the issue). Some speculate that
the holding of AT&T will have a spillover effect onto a corporation's relationship with its
shareholders, particularly in the securities class action context. Jennifer B. Poppe &
Alithea Z. Sullivan, Could the Supreme Court's Enforcement of Arbitration in
Concepcion Reverberate in the Securities Litigation Sphere?, 8 SEC. LITIG. REP., no. 8,
Sept. 2011, at 1; Vinson & Elkins, Securities Litigation Insights, at 4 (2011), available at
http://www.velaw.com/uploadedFiles/VEsite/Resources/SecuritiesLitigationnsightsAugu
st201l1.pdf.
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arbitration clauses within corporate bylaws for use in resolving shareholder
derivative suits have not been so readily adopted.9 Issues of internal
corporate governance involving disputes between shareholders, public
corporations, and management are traditionally seen as more appropriately
handled by state courts rather than private decision-makers.' 0 However,
"sporadic academic duels over the relationship between arbitration and
public corporate governance have set the stage for a legal battle now
inevitable."' 1
Several independent indicators point to increased popularity of
mandatory arbitration clauses in corporate bylaws. A greater number of
companies trading on U.S. stock markets are inserting arbitration clauses into
their bylaws. 12 Empirical studies taken from the years 1996 to 2007 indicate
a steady increase in the number of companies registered in the United States
who opted for arbitration (from eighteen in 1996 to forty-one in 2006).13 The
SEC, which has explicit authority to regulate mandatory arbitration
provisions under Dodd-Frank, has tentatively adopted a more welcome
attitude toward arbitration of disputes within the securities law realm. 14
Finally, modern judicial rulings favoring arbitration agreements in the
corporate setting have become increasingly prevalent.' 5
9 See, e.g., In re Salomon Inc. S'holders' Derivative Litig., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13874 at *41-42 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1994) (finding that an enforceable arbitration
agreement existed in a public corporation regardless of the absence of shareholder
ratification). The New York Stock Exchange reacted to the Salomon decision by
forbidding arbitration of derivative claims. See NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure for
Customer Disputes, § 12205 FINRA (2008), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/rule-filing/p018365.pdf.
10 Ravanides, supra note 2, at 374.
11 Id
12 Id. at 378.
13 Id. at 393.
14 See, e.g., Kara Scannell, SEC Explores Opening Door to Arbitration, WALL ST. J.,
April 16, 2007, at Al, available at
http://www.1aw.harvard.edu/programs/corpgov/MediaMentions/04-16-07_WSJ.pdf. On
May 3, 2012, the SEC approved of a raise in the limit for damages awarded in FINRA
simplified arbitration proceedings from $25,000 to $50,000, which will presumably lead
to an increase in number of claims administered by FINRA's arbitration program. SEC,
34-66913, at 10 (2012), reprinted in 2012 SEC LEXIS 1415.
15 See, e.g., Maureen Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications
ofArbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1711, 1715 (2006) (citing Southland,
supra note 7) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court has, since the 1980s, consistently
recognized a 'national policy favoring arbitration' and relied on the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) to uphold enforcement of these contracts."). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., No
Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of
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This note addresses the following scenario: Large public corporation A
has included a provision in its charter' 6 mandating that all shareholders are
limited to arbitration proceedings in lieu of litigation to carry out suits
brought on behalf of the corporation. There are both benefits and drawbacks
to such a provision, which affect the rights of shareholder owners, corporate
directors, and the corporation. The following discussion focuses less on the
enforceability of arbitration clauses and more on the effect such clauses
would have assuming they are enforceable by courts. Because the majority of
public corporations are incorporated in Delaware, this note frequently
discusses the implications of mandatory arbitration provisions within the
context of Delaware corporate law.17
Due to the momentum that mandatory arbitration provisions have gained
over the past decade, it is likely the Delaware courts, corporations, and their
shareholders will notice a change in the face of the derivative suit. Delaware
corporate law historically reflects a fundamental struggle between
corporations and their shareholders: Delaware law strives to enable directors
to exercise their unfettered business judgment in making management
decisions, while simultaneously incentivizing those directors to stay within
the bounds of their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care owed to the
corporation's shareholders. The shareholder derivative suit provides a
mechanism to keep a corporation's directors in check.' 8 But the mechanism
is not perfect. This note proposes that arbitration may provide an answer to
some of the problems that have arisen with derivative suits, and may even
provide unforeseen advantages to Delaware law.
Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 919, 919 (1988) (suggesting that, "[a]loof and insular as
corporate law often seems, it cannot remain uninfluenced for very long by developments
in the mainstream of American civil law."). Coffee notes two landmark cases in
particular, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) and Perry
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), which he predicted "will encourage the proponents of
alternative methods of dispute resolution to propose charter amendments under which all
internal corporate disputes should be resolved through arbitration." Id. at 954.
16 Throughout this note the terms "charter," "articles of incorporation," and
"bylaws" are used interchangeably to refer to a corporation's founding documents where
an arbitration provision binding shareholders would be found.
17 Sara Lewis, Transforming the "Anywhere but Chancery" Problem Into the
"Nowhere but Chancery" Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 199, 200 (2009) (noting
that approximately 60% of all publicly traded U.S. corporations are incorporated in
Delaware).
I8 Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May
Challenge Settlements in Class Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REv. 81, 135
(1998).
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Part II of this note will briefly review the current status of mandatory
arbitration agreements within Delaware courts today, as well as illuminate
lingering concerns with such arbitration clauses through a case study of a
recently announced initial public offering (IPO). Part III provides an
overview of mandatory arbitration clauses, their direct effects on
shareholders, and their major benefits and drawbacks noted throughout the
legal community. This section proposes that the benefits arguably outweigh
the drawbacks for corporations and their constituencies as a whole. Part IV
analyzes the constitutional implications of binding arbitration clauses on
shareholders' rights to sue on behalf of the corporation. Some argue that
forcing shareholders into arbitration takes away their fundamental right to
have their claims heard in a courtroom setting.19 Lastly, Part V addresses the
current status of the Federal Arbitration Act and foreshadows two major
obstacles this pro-arbitration legislation may face in the near future. This
section also provides an overview of the enforceability of mandatory
arbitration clauses under § 2 of the FAA and why any issues with
enforceability may be discarded in light of recent developments of forum
selection clauses and the enabling rights afforded to corporate directors under
§ 102(b)(1) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL).
II. THE Buzz IN DELAWARE: TRENDS IN USE OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS
In 2000, at a presentation discussing the role of corporate litigation in the
twenty-first century at the University of Virginia School of Law, former
President of the Delaware State Bar Association William Prickett challenged
his audience to imagine how the face of litigation would change with modern
times: "We should devote some of our creative energy to considering how
we can accelerate and make available the processes of the court to resolving
the important corporate issues without going through the nineteenth century
system of litigation." 20
Also presenting was E. Norman Veasey, former Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court, who highlighted the fact that the demand
requirement in the corporate derivative suit has been widely criticized and
the law has been reshaping itself as a result.21 Speculating into the future,
19 Ravanides, supra note 2, at 377.
20 E. Norman Veasey & Michael P. Dooley, The Role of Corporate Litigation in the
Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131, 156 (2000).
21 Id. at 138. See also id. at 154 (suggesting that the derivative action is "dead" in
Delaware because "one is forced to spend a year-and-a-half or so diddling around with
the preliminary issue of demand.").
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Justice Veasey declared, "We'll see more court-appointed experts in certain
areas. There'll be more alternate dispute resolution. There has to be. Courts
cannot handle it without it." 22 More than a decade after Prickett and Veasey
made their predictions, a noticeable trend toward using arbitration to resolve
shareholder derivative claims has arisen in Delaware and elsewhere.
A. Delaware's Enabling Law
Until recently, perhaps the most telling indication that arbitration
-agreements within corporate bylaws would become increasingly prevalent
was within the Delaware judiciary itself. Following enabling legislation
passed in 2009 by the Delaware General Assembly, the Court of Chancery
adopted rules governing arbitration in 2010.23 The relevant statutes are 10
Del. C. §§ 349 and 351, along with the accompanying Court of Chancery
Rules 96-98 (Arbitration Rules).24 The passing of this legislation indicated
the Chancery Court's approval of arbitration within the corporate context,
and furthermore may indicate that arbitration will become an increasingly
common way of resolving shareholder disputes. 25
Section 349 of the Delaware Code, acting as an enabling statute,
provides that "[t]he Court of Chancery shall have the power to arbitrate
business disputes when the parties request a member of the Court of
Chancery, or such other person as may be authorized under rules of the
Court, to arbitrate a dispute . . . ."26 The Code also states that arbitration
proceedings will be held confidential and outside of the public record unless
the outcome of arbitration is appealed. 27 Any appealed arbitration cases go
directly to the Delaware Supreme Court.28
As outlined in Rules 96-98, Chancery Court arbitration provides several
advantages to parties seeking to resolve disputes outside of the traditional
courtroom setting. First, matters submitted to arbitration are usually resolved
22 Id. at 140 (citing Mediation Rule 174).
23 DEL. CH. CT. R. 96-98 (2010), available at
http://courts.delaware.gov/rules/Chancery96-97-98_0201 10.pdf.
24 Id (these rules give the Court of Chancery the power to arbitrate disputes at the
request of both parties).
25 Lewis Lazarus, Court of Chancery Arbitration Likely to Become More Prevalent,
MORRIS JAMES, LLP (Sept. 28, 2011, 11:46 AM),
http://www.morrisjames.com/pp/article-58.pdf.
26 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 349(a) (West 2006).
27 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 349(b) (West 2006).
28 Lazarus, supra note 25 (unless parties stipulate to a non-appealable arbitration
award under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 351).
742
[Vol. 28:3 2013]
IN A BIND
quickly; arbitration hearings are normally scheduled within ninety days of
the filing of a petition, unless otherwise provided by the parties.29 Disputes
are resolved by decision-makers with the knowledge and experience of
chancellors, as "arbitrator" is defined as "a judge or master sitting
permanently in the court." 30 All Chancery Court arbitration proceedings are
confidential-even the filing of a petition for arbitration will not be included
on the court's docket system.31 Finally, not all cases are eligible to be
submitted to arbitrators; the amount in controversy must exceed $1 million if
monetary damages are sought, the case must involve a dispute involving at
least one party who is a Delaware entity, and both parties must have agreed
to arbitration proceedings. 32 These benefits of efficiency, confidentiality, and
expertise may lead to increased utilization of Chancery Court arbitration to
resolve complex business disputes. Moreover, if shareholders are deemed to
have "agreed to arbitration proceedings" by adhering to the corporation's
bylaws, Chancery Court arbitration could potentially apply to shareholder
derivative suits.
Despite the potential of Delaware Chancery Court arbitration to launch
corporate arbitration proceedings into the forefront of Delaware
jurisprudence, a ruling on August 30, 2012 by a district court judge struck
down the arbitration provision on the grounds that the secrecy of these
arbitration proceedings violated the First Amendment, which recognizes a
qualified right of access to all civil and criminal trials. 33 United States
District Court Judge Mary McLaughlin ruled that a Chancery Court
arbitration proceeding is "essentially a civil trial," and that despite the
efficiencies arbitration presents, "the judiciary as a whole is strengthened by
the public knowledge that its courthouses are open and judicial officers are
not adjudicating in secret." 34 Only six cases have been arbitrated to date
29 DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(e).
30 DEL. CH. CT. R. 96(d)(2).
31 DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(a)(4) (but if the controversy is appealed to the Supreme Court,
the record shall be filed by the parties).
32 Lazarus, supra note 25, at 1.
33 Steven M. Davidoff, The Life and Death of Delaware's Arbitration Experiment,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBK (Aug. 31, 2012, 11:58 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/the-life-and-death-of-delawares-arbitration-
experiment/.
34 Del. Coalition v. Strine, No. 1:11-1015, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980 at *27, 31
(D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012).
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under the Delaware arbitration rules, and five of them have no public
record. 35
The impact of the district court's ruling could deal a substantial blow to
the increasing use of arbitration in the corporate context-at least within
Delaware. However, the ultimate legality of Delaware's arbitration
proceedings is yet to be determined; the Delaware Coalition case was
appealed to the Third Circuit on October 4, 2012. Both parties in the lawsuit
have received backing from amicus curiae briefs. Notably, the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and the corporate law section of the
Delaware State Bar Association36 filed briefs supporting Delaware's current
arbitration statute.37
Furthermore, Judge McLaughlin's district court opinion swung on the
fact that Delaware Chancery Court justices were the ones presiding over the
arbitration proceedings, as opposed to court-annexed arbitrations conducted
by third parties.38 Thus, she leaves open the possibility of a revised Chancery
Court arbitration provision mandating the use of outside third parties to
conduct arbitration proceedings, which would presumably achieve the same
principles of efficiency such rules originally presented.
B. The Carlyle Group IPO
A recent example of the contentions surrounding the growing use of the
mandatory arbitration clause is the forthcoming IPO of private equity group
the Carlyle Group (Carlyle). The Carlyle Group is creating buzz around the
corporate legal community for creating an IPO that is particularly unfriendly
toward its shareholders. The news once again raises discussions surrounding
the implementation of mandatory arbitration to resolve shareholder disputes.
Carlyle's proposed IPO filing contained a provision requiring all shareholder
35 Rita K. Farrell, Judge Rules Against Arbitration by a Delaware Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at B2.
36 Id
37 Pamela Park, Litigation Watch: Delaware Chancery Court Arbitrations Come
Under Fire, THOMPSON REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/
Article.aspx?id=d2f78fe7-65c7-4cbl-aeee-d7cdef5385&cid=&src=&sp=. See also
Brief for The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and the Business
Roundtable as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Delaware Coalition for
Open Government, Inc., v. The Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., et. al., 2012 WL 3744718,
available at http://www.chamberlitigation.com/sites/default/files/cases/files/2012
/NCLC%20amicus%20brief/o20--%20Delaware%20Coalition%20for/o200pen
%20Govemment,%2OInc.%20v.%20The%2OHon.%2OLeo%20E.%20Strine,%2OJr.,%20
et%20al.,%20%28Third%20Circuit%29.pdf.
3 8 Del. Coalition, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123980, at *27.
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disputes-involving both state law and federal securities law claims-to be
submitted to private, confidential arbitration. 39 Foreshadowing further
developments in this area, Steven M. Davidoff, law professor at The Ohio
State University, states, "Carlyle is being super-aggressive here because it
knows that, to the extent the arbitration provision covers federal securities
law, its legality is uncertain." 40
In fact, Carlyle announced within a matter of days of releasing the
structure of its IPO that it planned to withdraw the proposed arbitration
provision due to increased pressure from investors and regulators. 41
Responding to accusations that Carlyle was using the arbitration provision as
a means to dilute shareholder power, Carlyle's spokesperson told reporters
that "[Carlyle] first offered the provision because we believed that arbitrating
claims would be more efficient, cost effective and beneficial to our
unitholders." 42 The recent contentions surrounding the Carlyle Group's IPO
reflects a rare cautionary approach to arbitration clauses in the wake of the
FAA. The SEC in its ruling noted the unique status of arbitration provisions
within the securities context and their potential drawback of weakening
investor protections.43 Because federal securities law is primarily aimed at
deterring fraud and exposing misleading disclosures to the investor
39 Steven M. Davidoff, Carlyle Readies an Unfriendly I.P. 0. for Shareholders, N.Y.
TIMES DEALB%K (Jan. 18, 2012, 3:19 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/carlyle-readies-an-unfriendly-i-p-o-for-
shareholders/.
40 Id
41 Kevin Roose, Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause From 1.P.O. Plans, N.Y. TIMES
DEALB%K (Feb. 3, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyle-
drops-arbitration-clause-from-i-p-o-plans/. In response to Carlyle's proposed mandatory
arbitration clause, three democratic congressmen drafted a letter to then-sitting SEC
chairwoman Mary L. Shapiro asking the SEC to block the IPO if the clause is not
removed. Id. See also Letter from Cong. Comm. to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC
(Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Letter-to-SEC-Arbitration-
of-Shareholder-Claims.pdf. Carlyle also faced uncertainty from the SEC, which has been
hesitant in the past with corporate POs that include similar arbitration provisions. Roose,
supra. However, the contention surrounding Carlyle's particular arbitration provision
may be attributable to the fact that the provision provided for private mandatory
arbitration proceedings to resolve shareholder disputes, which would be set within
boundaries established by Carlyle. This may be more extreme than arbitration
proceedings which take place within the Delaware courts and heard by neutral, qualified
arbitrators. Davidoff, supra note 33.
42 Roose, supra note 41.
43 Lawrence A. Cunningham, So much for your day in court, BALTIMORESUN,
Mar. 21, 2012, www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-arbitration-
20120321,0,970456.story.
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community, confidential arbitration hearings arguably cannot offer the same
exposure and subsequent deterring effect as a public trial.44
Whether courts will agree with the SEC's opinion on Carlyle and carve
out an exception to its increasingly favor arbitrationis stance is yet to be
determined. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Professor at George Washington
Law School, is doubtful that the U.S. Supreme Court will change its tune.45
He further predicts that more companies, now intrigued by Carlyle's strategy,
will be adopting mandatory arbitration clauses into their charters in the near
future.46
C. Finding a Middle Ground
Despite indications that Delaware corporations prefer to use arbitration
proceedings to resolve shareholder derivative complaints, several grumblings
of disapproval from a variety of scholars remain. Many suggest that cases
which involve subject matter that is particularly ground-breaking or
noteworthy within Delaware corporate law should not be reduced to
principles of arbitration because case precedent is continuously relied upon
44 Id.
45 Id. (speculating that the Supreme Court could "portray a corporate charter as a
contract binding on even those who opposed it and rebuke the [C]ommission's public
policy concerns to channel all disputes over corporate securities into closed-door
arbitration hearings."). See also Carter Dougherty, Consumers May See New Limits on
Mandatory Arbitration, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (May 21, 2012), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-05-21/consumers-may-see-new-limits-on-
mandatory-arbitration (commenting that despite the SEC's reaction to Carlyle's
mandatory arbitration clause, "the SEC could be vulnerable to a court challenge on
forcing shareholders to arbitrate. The SEC relies on longstanding practice, not a specific
regulation or law, to stamp out arbitration clauses for shareholders.").
46 Cunningham, supra note 43. The Carlyle Group, however, faced lukewarm
investor interest prior to its IPO. This was reportedly partially a result of Carlyle's
practice of putting shareholder rights second to other private equity asset management
firms. Steven M. Davidoff, In Private Equity IPO, a Shareholder Fear of Losing Favor,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBK (Mar. 13, 2012, 6:46 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/in-private-equity-i-p-o-a-shareholder-fear-of-
losing-favor/. Unlike other publicly traded companies which make their fiduciary duties
to shareholders a first priority, managers of publicly traded private equity firms have a
tendency to favor themselves and their fund investors over its shareholders. Id. The
Carlyle Group went public on May 3, 2012 at $22 per share, which was below the $23-
$25 range originally proposed in its filing with the SEC. Dan Primak, Carlyle Group
Prices Low IPO, FORTUNE.CNN.cOM (Mar. 2, 2012, 5:56 PM),
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/02/carlyle-group-prices-low-ipo/.
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throughout the legal community.47 Some cases may be simply too important
to be kept confidential.48 This concern reflects the larger question of how the
foundational principles of corporate law will evolve with increasingly
frequent arbitration proceedings. 49
To mitigate these concerns, the Delaware courts may wish to "cap" their
use of arbitration to smaller derivative claims involving collateral issues and
instead force more significant derivative claims to be litigated.50 However,
this suggestion raises serious issues with the enforceability of mandatory
arbitration clauses. If courts were to filter out "critical" derivative suits from
ones with lesser impact, uncertainty would be created with each arbitration
clause that corporations place in their bylaws. Instead, Delaware courts must
consider the overall benefits and drawbacks of using arbitration agreements
in corporate bylaws, and possibly look to other areas of the law to understand
why such alternative dispute mechanisms are gaining in popularity. Upon
doing so, perhaps the concerns surrounding mandatory arbitration clauses
can be balanced against offsetting benefits to Delaware courts, corporations,
and shareholders alike.
III. OVERVIEW: BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF USING ARBITRATION IN
THE CONTEXT OF SHAREHOLDER SUITS
Shareholder derivative suits represent the cornerstone of shareholders'
rights to monitor the conduct and behavior of the corporation's managers. 51
Derivative suits play a particularly important role in public corporations (as
opposed to closely held corporations), 52 where control is separated from
47 See, e.g., Veasey & Dooley, supra note 20, at 155.
48 Id
49 Scholars that caution against arbitration insist that "the only way the Delaware
corporate law is going to develop is through litigation. If the Delaware corporate law
does not continue to grow, it will stultify and will no longer be the preeminent forum for
the resolution of these very important corporate issues." Id.
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
52 This note addresses shareholder derivative suits in the context of public
corporations, as opposed to closely held corporations. One of the early obstacles to
arbitration of shareholder derivative suits within close corporations was the prospect of
violations of public policy, raising the question of whether shareholder claims may be
arbitrated at all. G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C.L.
REv. 517, 531 (1989). Many close corporations once avoided arbitration by arguing that a
corporation was not a party to the shareholder arbitration agreement. Id. However, courts
have since held that a close corporation binds itself into an arbitration agreement by
signing the agreement itself. Id. at 532. Courts tend to consider close corporations and
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ownership of corporate assets. 53 Because managers in large public
corporations do not necessarily have an ownership stake in the company they
are managing, shareholders face possible agency costs in the form of
mismanagement or misappropriation of corporate assets.54
The derivative suit, in addition to the shareholders' right to vote,
provides a disincentive for corporate managers to act against the best interest
of the corporation and its constituents while providing a mechanism for the
shareholder's voice to be heard. In a derivative suit, shareholders of a
corporation sue the corporate directors and officers on behalf of the
corporation itself for a wrongdoing that has harmed the corporation-usually
in the form of a breach of fiduciary duty.55 All awards resulting from the
derivative suit are given to corporate funds, as opposed to the shareholders as
individuals who stand to personally gain from monetary awards. 56
A. A Critique of The Derivative Action
Despite its prominent place in Delaware corporate law, derivative suits
have become heavily criticized due to shareholders frequently abusing their
right to sue. 57 This especially holds true in class action complaints stemming
from a corporation's decision to partake in change-in-control transactions of
some sort.58 It is often the case that, after management announces a merger
or acquisition stemming from a drop in stock price, shareholder-plaintiffs'
attorneys immediately file multiple identical lawsuits against management
for breach of fiduciary duties, and will quickly settle with corporations for
large sums of money before going to trial. 59 This recurring pattern of filing a
their shareholders "one party" for purposes of arbitration, thus allowing arbitration
proceedings to occur. Id Arbitration is now an accepted means of resolving shareholder
disputes in close corporations. Id. at 533.
53 Id. at 535.
54 Id.
55 Glenn G. Morris, Shareholder Derivative Suits: Louisiana Law, 56 LA. L. REv.
583, 584 (1996).
56 Id. at 589-90.
57 Shell, supra note 52, at 540.
58 Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 133, 134-35 (2004)
("Derivative lawsuits and federal securities class actions are portrayed as slackers in
debates over how best to control the managerial agency costs created by the separation of
ownership and control in the modem corporation .... [E]arly hopes that these suits
would effectively monitor managerial misconduct have been replaced with concerns
about the size of the litigation agency costs of such representative litigation.").
59 Id. at 138.
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shareholder complaint and quickly settling for large sums of money has
earned many plaintiffs' attorneys the name "pilgrims." 60 As a result, the
fundamental reason for derivative suits-to guarantee a check on managerial
behavior-has been eroding in the face of complaint frivolity.6 1
The drawbacks exemplified in "pilgrim plaintiffs" cases stemming from
board decisions to merge with or acquire another entity have had a spill-over
effect on Delaware corporations' recurring criticisms toward derivative
litigation. Corporate directors frequently complain that litigated derivative
suits result from plaintiffs' attorneys' misdirected motives for suing "on
behalf of a corporation"; many attorneys sue merely to glean attorneys' fees,
rather than suing because of the merits of the derivative claim.62 In addition,
litigation can be costly and time consuming for corporations, and corporate
directors are easily distracted from their normal duties within the corporation
as a result. 63 This holds especially true for derivative litigation as opposed to
other forms of litigation; plaintiff shareholders wishing to bring a derivative
claim must surpass a variety of requirements (the most prominent being the
demand requirement) before bringing suit.64 If plaintiffs cannot satisfy the
demand requirement, there is a risk that their claim may not be heard at all.65
60 In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting that
lawsuits brought by "frequent filers" tend to settle more quickly than other plaintiffs'
attorneys). The Delaware Chancery Court further commented in Revlon that "[t]raditional
plaintiffs' law firms who bring class and derivative lawsuits on behalf of stockholders
without meaningful economic stakes can best be viewed as entrepreneurial litigators who
manage a portfolio of cases to maximize their returns through attorneys' fees." Id at 959.
61 As a result of increasingly frequent derivative complaints, many courts are now
requiring plaintiffs to post bonds to insure that they will be able to pay defendant's
attorneys' fees and other expenses in the event that such suits will be dismissed as
frivolous. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 58, at 136.
62 Sockol, supra note 3, at 1096.
63 Id at 1097.
64 Id The preconditions that must be satisfied before bringing a derivative suit are
outlined in FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 and MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 7.40-.47 (1999),
which include the demand requirement, the contemporaneous ownership requirement,
and special pleading rules. See Bryan Stanfield, For Better or For Worse?: Marriage of
the Texas and Model Business Corporation Acts' Derivative Action Statutes and What it
Means for Corporations, 35 TEx. TECH L. REv. 347, 350-52 (2004).
65 Indeed, some suggest that arbitration panels would lead to a greater likelihood of
derivative suits reaching the merits of the action by avoiding stifling special litigation
committees of corporations quickly rejecting shareholder demand. Coffee, supra note 15,
at 958. As arbitration provides a more flexible proceeding, Coffee suggests shareholders
may gain a "greater access to external monitoring" through arbitration. Id.
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Finally, derivative suits are repeatedly criticized for failing to result in any
substantial benefit to the corporation and its shareholders. 66
B. The Benefits ofArbitration
The possibility of arbitrating shareholder complaints presents
corporations with an outlet against these recurring drawbacks of derivative
suits. Professor of Legal Studies at the University of Pennsylvania G.
Richard Shell outlines four general ways arbitration benefits the corporation
and reduces overall transaction costs.67 Arbitration of shareholder suits
potentially: (1) helps to build an atmosphere of trust and goodwill among
shareholders and directors, as opposed to contentious litigation, (2) provides
the parties to the arbitration with a wider variety of resources, information,
and ideas to help solve contractual impasses, (3) reduces tension among the
parties by providing neutral "division services," and (4) provides quick and
efficient resolution of shareholder disputes. 68 Due to lower discovery costs,
arbitration can prove less costly for corporations than a judicial proceeding.69
Attorneys' fees would also likely be significantly lower if arbitration is
utilized, which in turn allows the corporation itself to glean a greater portion
of the net pecuniary award resulting from the outcome of the arbitration.70
In addition to the benefit of cost savings, shareholders may also be more
attracted to a neutral arbitration panel to hear their derivative complaint. This
holds especially true if they are facing the influence of a corporation's
special litigation committee, which may decide for various reasons that it is
in the best interest of the corporation to not proceed with a derivative suit.7 1
Mandatory arbitration clauses grant the corporation, and its shareholders by
way of adopting the corporation's bylaws, the ability to choose who hears
and resolves their dispute.72 Finally, a group of independent arbitrators could
66 Sockol, supra note 3, at 1116.
67 Shell, supra note 52, at 568-69.
68 Id. See also H. R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess., at 2 (1924) ("[T]he
costliness and delays of litigation . . . can be largely eliminated by agreements for
arbitration.").
69 Sockol, supra note 3, at 1114. See also Ravanides, supra note 2, at 374.
70 Sockol, supra note 3, at 1099.
71 Shell, supra note 52, at 573 (Likewise,"[i]f legislatures begin to view special
litigation committees more skeptically and bar their use, corporate managers may seek
arbitration as preferable to judicial control over shareholder claims.").
72 Paul B. Marrow, Determining if Mandatory Arbitration is "Fair":
Asymmetrically Held Information and the Role of Mandatory Arbitration in Modulating
Uninsurable Contract Risks, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 187, 192 (2010).
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potentially guarantee expertise in arbitrating derivative suits and provide
precedent comparable to that which is now relied on within the Delaware
judiciary.73 This final proposition has great potential for truth if the trend in
corporate law of defaulting corporate complaints to an arbitration setting
continues into the future.
C. The Drawbacks ofMandatory Arbitration
Although gaining in popularity, mandatory arbitration clauses within
corporate bylaws are not a perfect solution to the abuses of shareholder
litigation. They, too, have faced a variety of criticisms within the legal
community. 74 For instance, there is concern that uneven bargaining power
between a corporation and its shareholders may lead to corporations showing
the upper hand in electing arbitrators, and therefore unfairly influencing the
arbitration process. 75 Furthermore, because arbitration outcomes need not be
based upon rules of law, "[fliduciary norms may ... be subordinated to
general equitable principles in arbitration." 76 This may lead not only to an
inconsistent application of current legal rules, but also a diminished deterrent
effect of binding fiduciary duties upon corporate directors.77 Many believe
that arbitrating shareholder suits will endanger shareholder rights by denying
access to the courts and halt developments of legal doctrine in the area of
corporate governance.78 Complex arbitration proceedings can take just as
long and prove just as costly as litigation proceedings.79 Finally, many public
corporations choose to incorporate in Delaware solely to have access to the
expertise provided; arbitrators arguably cannot provide the same expertise
that years of judicial precedent have set in place. 80
73 Sockol, supra note 3, at 1115.
74 Jeffrey A. Sanbom, The Rise of "Shareholder Derivative Arbitration" in Public
Corporations: In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders'Derivative Litigation, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 337, 338 (1996) (noting criticisms by legal commentators and state legislatures).
75 Shell, supra note 52, at 549-50.
76 Id. at 561.
77 Id
7 8 Id at 573.
79 Id. at 572.
80 Sockol, supra note 3, at 1111.
751
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
D. A Net Benefit to Corporations and Shareholders Alike
The benefits to be gained from using arbitration arguably outweigh the
previously-listed drawbacks-possibly explaining the trend toward increased
arbitration clauses within corporate bylaws. Furthermore, many of the
potential drawbacks surrounding the use of such clauses can be minimized.
For instance, although some believe that arbitrating derivative complaints in
a private, extrajudicial setting will remove incentives for directors to abide
by their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the corporation, other market
forces counteract this concern; the election of an initially strong board of
directors, regular audits by independent accounting firms, and the listing
requirements by self-regulatory organizations like the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) all act to counter the possibility of managerial
wrongdoing.81 Also, the prediction that mandatory arbitration will encroach
upon Delaware common law precedent has been downcast as unlikely;
arbitration proceedings are solely meant to complement court-held derivative
litigation, and the Legislature and Bar Association deemed the possibility of
"crowding out" the regular docket with arbitrated claims very unlikely.82
Shareholders are not completely left without an alternative when
mandatory arbitration clauses are found in corporate bylaws. In the event that
shareholders are not satisfied with the outcome of arbitration proceedings or
both parties fail to come to a mutually acceptable settlement, shareholders
have additional resources at their disposal to resolve their claims; for
instance, shareholders may approach the board of directors directly to discuss
proposed reforms, prepare a stockholder resolution for an upcoming annual
meeting, or launch a proxy fight to elect new directors.83 Shareholders also
have the ability to bring expedited vacatur and modification of the arbitration
settlement under FAA §§ 10-11.84
81 Thompson & Thomas, supra note 58, at 142. See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMics 404 (2002) (noting that if derivative litigation were
eliminated entirely, "[d]irectors would remain subject to various forms of market
discipline, including ... markets for corporate control and employment, proxy contests,
and shareholder litigation where the challenged misconduct gives rise to a direct cause of
action.").
82 Delaware Business Court Arbitration Program Provides Fast Resolution Path for
Fortune 500 Company Disputes, JAMS DIsPUTE RESOLUTION ALERT, 1-3 (2011),
available at www.mediationworld.net/uploads/201211815121 .pdf.
83 Norfolk Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20
at *30 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2009) (internal citation omitted).
84 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2006) (allowing modification of awards on the grounds of
corruption, fraud, undue means, or miscalculation, misconduct, misbehavior, or evident
partiality by the arbitrator). See also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
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Arbitrating shareholder complaints presents a board of directors with the
opportunity to focus on their roles within the corporation and work toward
maximization of corporate profit and shareholder value-without having to
worry about litigating against shareholder complaints in the courtroom. A
major criticism of derivative suits, despite their ability to deter malfeasance
of corporate directors, is their potential to stifle profit-enhancing creativity
among management. As corporate managers are constantly acting under the
threat of being sued for breach of fiduciary duties,85 they may be hesitant to
take risks and avoid experimentation that leads to corporate profitability.86
As a result, the net benefit of these mandatory arbitration clauses will be felt
not only by directors in terms of diminished distractions from their corporate
duties and the Delaware courts, which will hear smaller numbers of frivolous
shareholder complaints, but also by the shareholders themselves. By
providing directors the opportunity to focus their efforts on the corporate
mission with minimal distractions, the likelihood of maximizing shareholder
value increases.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS: DOES MANDATORY ARBITRATION
DENY SHAREHOLDERS THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUE ON
BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION?
With increasing popularity of arbitration clauses in corporate charters
comes increased concern by constituents-including shareholders,
consumers, and employees-that their constitutional right to sue is being
curtailed. The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 201187 attempts to
address this concern by allowing those constituents to decide for themselves
whether their claim should be arbitrated or litigated.8 8 The legislation has
raised questions regarding the constitutional implications mandatory
arbitration clauses have on shareholders' rights to sue. Much debate has
576, 586 (2008). Courts also have the ability to declare the arbitration clauses themselves
invalid under the FAA's saving statute, which allows courts to invalidate agreements
"upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
85 Notwithstanding any § 102(b)(7) provisions exculpating directors from actions of
gross negligence.
86 Thomas P. Kinny, Stockholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility Where the
Board Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 172, 174-75 (1994).
87 H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2009).
88 See, e.g., http://www.fairarbitrationnow.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2013).
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surrounded the question of whether it is fundamentally fair to force
shareholders into arbitration proceedings. 89
A. Judicial Findings of Constitutionality
The Southern District of New York case In re Salomon Shareholders'
Derivative Litigation90 exemplifies a trend among courts across jurisdictions
holding that mandatory arbitration clauses align with shareholders'
constitutional rights. The court in Salomon granted the defendant
corporation's motion to compel arbitration with plaintiff shareholders, citing
the FAA as well as the rules of the NYSE for authority.91 The court declared
that shareholder rights were not curtailed by honoring an arbitration
agreement because, in a derivative suit, "the corporation [is] suing in its own
right."92 Decided in 1994, this case formally recognized a substantive right to
arbitration for shareholders, and slowly set the tone for greater acceptance of
arbitration within shareholder derivative suits. 93
A case that preceded Salomon was Ross v. Bernhard, where the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized that the corporation itself, not the shareholder
initiating the derivative suit, is the necessary party to a derivative action.94
The Court in Ross deemphasized shareholders' rights within a derivative
context by reminding the judicial community that the fundamental purpose
behind a derivative suit is to vindicate the claims of the corporation: "[T]he
shareholders, 'standing in the shoes of the corporation[,]' have no rights
greater than those of the corporation, nor can those they choose to sue be
deprived of defenses they could assert against the corporation's claims." 95
Thus, as long as the corporation agreed to arbitrate its claims, the arbitration
89 Ravanides, supra note 2, at 377.
90 In re Salomon, supra note 9, at *2.
91 Id. at *41-42. Article XI, § I of the NYSE Constitution, which governs
arbitration of disputes between members of the NYSE, provides, "Any controversy
between parties who are members . .. shall at the instance of any such party be submitted
for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and [NYSE rules]."
Id. at *7-8.
92 In re Salomon, supra note 9, at *14.
93 Sockol, supra note 3, at 1114. See also Ravanides, supra note 2, at 424.
94 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970) ("The heart of the action is the
corporate claim."). See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 81, at 385 (noting that state courts
vary widely in recognizing a constitutional right to trial by jury in derivative suits).
95 In re Salomon, supra note 9, at *13 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534
(1970)).
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agreement must be upheld and shareholders' rights to sue are not
unconstitutionally violated.96
B. The Other Side of the Coin: The Shareholder's Perspective
Despite the positive trend among courts, a competing public policy
argument has been repeated by plaintiffs for decades: shareholders
themselves do not sign the agreement to arbitrate; thus, there is no way to
ensure by a neutral arbitrator that corporate abuses are continuously
monitored and corporate management is acting in the best interests of the
corporation.97 Indeed, the shareholder derivative suit, "born of stockholder
helplessness, was long the chief regulator of corporate management and has
afforded no small incentive to avoid at least the grosser forms of betrayal of
stockholders' interests." 98
Moreover, there is a question of whether mandatory arbitration clauses
overstep a party's right to a jury trial-thus eliminating, or at least
diminishing, the deterrent effects corporate actions have when held in the
judicial setting.99 The question of whether binding arbitration clauses violate
a party's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial has been addressed in
several contexts,100 but arbitration agreements can particularly curtail the
constitutional rights of those parties to a class action.101 Many derivative
suits are technically a form of class actions, 102 so the same questions of
constitutional rights to trial by jury apply.
C. Answering Constitutional Concerns
Whether constitutional rights of shareholders are violated within a
derivative context is somewhat of a different question than whether they are
violated in a traditional lawsuit. The U.S. Supreme Court formally
acknowledged the right of a corporation to have its claim heard by a jury in
96 Id. at *15.
97 Cf Fox v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 453 F. Supp. 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting
that "[a] valid arbitration provision must be in writing, but a party may be bound by that
provision without having signed an exemplar.").
98 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
99 In re Salomon, supra note 9, at *21-22. See also Feingold, supra note 3, at 288.
100 Jean R. Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 669, 680 (2001).
101 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 5 (2000).
102 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 55, at 591. See also Sanborn, supra note 74, at 363.
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Ross v. Bernhard.103 However, shareholders do not always forego their right
to a jury trial by relying on arbitration to resolve the dispute. Many times the
alternative is to have their derivative claim heard by a judge without a
jury. 104 In fact, most states have rejected the Ross v. Bernhard approach and
hold that there is no right to a trial by jury in shareholder derivative suits, as
there is generally no right to a jury trial in courts of equity.105 In Delaware,
the frontrunner of state corporate law, all derivative suits are filed in the
Court of Chancery, which sits without a jury. 106 Furthermore, derivative suits
are often settled (or dismissed because of lack of demand futility) before a
case gets to trial.107 Thus, the constitutional right of shareholders to have the
corporation's claim heard before a court may, for practical reasons, not be of
great significance.
The district court in Salomon answered these policy concerns by leaving
it up to Congress to change: "[I]f the parties' agreement to arbitrate covers
statutory claims, the claim is non-arbitrable only where 'Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue."' 108 Congress can always exclude particular classes
of disputes from the scope of the FAA by declaring them non-arbitrable.109
There are currently no statutes prohibiting arbitration of matters involving
public companies and their shareholders; thus, no statutory conflict exists
between arbitration of a derivative suit and the underlying purpose of the
103 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970); but cf id at 546 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "historically the [derivative] suit has in practice always been
treated as a single cause tried exclusively in equity ... . [T]here is therefore no
constitutional right to a jury trial even where there might have been one had the
corporation itself brought the suit.").
104 See 19 AM. JuR. 2D Corporations § 2373 (1986) ("In the absence of statutory
provisions to the contrary . .. in [a derivative] suit in state court, the stockholders are not
entitled, as a matter of right to a trial by jury.").
105 Ann M. Scarlett, Shareholders in the Jury Box: A Populist Check Against
Corporate Mismanagement, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 127, 147 (2009).
106 Id. at 147-48.
107 See Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 U.
KAN. L. REv. 83, 116 (2007) ("There are strong incentives for a derivative suit to settle
before a trial on the merits."); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'
Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 44 (1991) ("Most class action and
derivative litigation is settled prior to judgment.").
108 In re Salomon, supra note 9, at *23 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
109 Ravanides, supra note 2, at 429.
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FAA favoring arbitration."l 0 Furthermore, the argument that common law
precedent, especially within the realm of corporate law, cannot be replaced
by arbitration rulings lacks foundation absent contrary legislative intent: "As
the FAA's federal pro-arbitration policy preempts contrary state policies,
absent a federal statute reflecting clear congressional intent to refute the
arbitrability of intra-corporate controversies, arbitration agreements could not
be set aside on state policy grounds."I' 
The debate over the constitutional rights of plaintiffs in a derivative suit
continues to be a topic of contention in the wake of increasing arbitration
proceedings.11 2 Delaware Courts at least provide shareholder plaintiffs with
the opportunity to have their claims heard in front of a neutral arbitrator
within the four walls of the court, albeit not necessarily inside a courtroom in
front of a jury. 113 Many argue that the "secret proceedings" held in the
Delaware Chancery Court promote efficiency while keeping the arbitration
fair to both parties.114 If the Delaware courts ceased to offer arbitration
proceedings, corporations would arguably look elsewhere to hold private
arbitration discussions-potentially increasing the risk that the results of the
dispute will be unfair to one party, stray from the ideals of Delaware
corporate law, and further encroach upon shareholders' constitutional
rights. 115
Although there are concerns over the possibility that mandatory
arbitration violates shareholders' constitutional right to access the judiciary,
110 Id. ("[T]he question in the case of intra-corporate arbitration would be whether
policies underpinning other statutory schemes clash with and prevail over the FAA's
favor arbitrationis.").
Ill Id. at 431.
112 See, e.g., Randall Chase, Judge Hears Arguments Over Secret Arbitration in
Business-oriented Delaware Court, COURIER-POST, Feb. 9, 2012, available at
http://www.courierpostonline.com/article/20120209/NEWSO5/202090344/Judge-
hears-arguments-over-secret-arbitration-business-oriented-Delaware-court (reporting
a movement by the Delaware Coalition for Open Government against the Delaware
Chancery Court's rule enabling arbitration, which claims that the law is an
unconstitutional violation of shareholders' access to the courts).
113 See Delaware Business Court Arbitration, supra note 82, at 3.
114Id. Corporations who choose to have the arbitration held within the Chancery
Court face a $12,000 filing fee and a daily fee of $6,000 for each day a judge is involved
in the arbitration. Id. Chancellor Strine himself commented that such arbitration offering
is "designed to ensure Delaware remained an attractive place for business entities to
form." Id
115 Id
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not all judicial tribunals are subject to public access.1 16 Resolving claims by
arbitration cannot be said to so drastically curtail shareholders' rights as to be
deemed unconstitutional.
V. SECTION 2 OF THE FAA AND RECENT CONTROVERSIES: POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
The source of arbitration law governing the enforceability of clauses
mandating the arbitration of shareholder derivative complaints is the FAA,
not state arbitration law." 7 The FAA, enacted in 1925, was created in order
to quell former judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements."18 The most
relevant section of the Act, § 2, states that "[a] written provision in. . . a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . .. shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 1 9 Because a corporation's
bylaws and articles of incorporation serve as a contractual agreement binding
the corporation, its directors, and its shareholders,1 20 § 2 of the FAA would
likely deem a contractual provision mandating arbitration of shareholder
derivative suits valid and enforceable.121
116 See Delaware Business Court Arbitration, supra note 82, at 3. For instance,
public access to courts is historically limited in familial disputes such as child custody or
marital relations.
117 Shell, supra note 52, at 543.
118 AT&T, supra note 4, at 1745. See also In re Salomon, supra note 9, at *9; 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 266 (2009) (upholding the enforcement of
arbitration clauses within collective bargaining agreements under the ideals of the FAA);
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (noting that the FAA
"requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate"); Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("[Q]uestions of arbitrability must
be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration").
I19 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
120 See, e.g., Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) (stating
that corporate bylaws are a contract between the corporation and its shareholders) (citing
Centaur Partners IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 926 (Del. 1990)).
121 This note assumes that corporate bylaws requiring arbitration are valid and
enforceable. Such enforceability questions are resolved by a court determining (1)
whether there is an agreement to arbitrate under the state's contract law principals, and
(2) whether that agreement is otherwise enforceable under defenses of law and equity
such as unconscionability or duress. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626-28 (1985) (noting arbitrability questions are normally
resolved by courts in favor of arbitration). Although the final clause of § 2 acts as a
savings clause to deem unenforceable arbitration clauses "upon such grounds as exist at
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A. Obstacles to the Legitimacy of the FAA
Although the FAA has gained legitimacy within Delaware courts and
among corporate law in general, it still faces challenges within the derivative
context. This section outlines those challenges and discusses whether they
present a substantial threat to the presence of corporate mandatory arbitration
provisions.
1. Conflicting Policy of the Arbitration Fairness Act
A recent proposal by Congress which threatens the enforceability of the
FAA is the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA), originally proposed by the
legislature in 2007 and reintroduced after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.122 As noted above,123 the U.S. Supreme
Court in AT&T required that courts give arbitration agreements as much
deference as other contracts and enforce them according to their terms, with
the exception of unconscionable contracts, or contracts resulting from fraud
or duress.124 In AT&T, the Court rejected the idea that arbitration agreements
among consumer contracts are void against public policy, thus establishing
the legitimacy of the FAA scheme with respect to consumer suits and their
use by corporations in general.125 But Congress, concerned that the Court's
AT&T decision denies consumers and workers the right to have their claims
heard in court,126 reacted by reintroducing the AFA-legislation which bars
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," the Supreme Court made clear in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that the scope of the savings clause which acts to
invalidate arbitration clauses should be limited to grounds of fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, not 'from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue."'
Barsalona, supra note 5, at 276 (quoting AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1746).
122 Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act
and the Supreme Court's Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REv. 457, 493
n.157 (2011).
123 See supra Part I.
124 AT&T Mobility, supra note 4, at 1745-46. See also Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1995) ("[T]he central purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act [is] to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according
to their terms.").
125 AT&T Mobility, supra note 4, at 1747 (ruling that "[r]equiring the availability of
classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates
a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.").
126 Kimberly Atkins, Legal Affairs: Lawmakers Again Try to Ban Forced
Arbitration Clauses, LEGALNEWS.COM (May 20, 2011),
http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/950169.
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pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses within contracts in order to protect
parties to contracts of unequal bargaining power. 127
The proposed AFA declares invalid pre-dispute arbitration agreements
affecting employment, consumer or franchise disputes, or a dispute arising
under "any statute intended to protect civil rights."' 28 The legislation further
proposes that the validity and enforceability of such arbitration agreements
be determined by the court, not an arbitrator, regardless of whether or not a
party challenges the arbitration agreement specifically.129
This latter provision-impressing upon courts to determine whether or
not an entire arbitration agreement is valid-goes directly against common
law precedent. The Supreme Court in 1967 originally ruled that a court can
hear claims regarding the validity of the arbitration clause, but not the
validity of the entire contract (e.g., the company charter) which is to be
determined by the arbitrator.13 0 The policy behind this decision is that a court
should not have to address the validity of an arbitration provision if the
document in which it is contained is deemed unenforceable by arbitration.131
In 2010, the Court changed this rule to further favor the arbitrator's
discretionary authority by stating that courts cannot decide challenges to the
validity of an arbitration agreement containing a provision delegating power
to an arbitrator to resolve threshold issues of validity of the agreement.132
127 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); see also
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). The AFA in part
provides, "[m]any corporations add to their arbitration clauses unfair provisions that
deliberately tilt the systems against individuals, including provisions that strip individuals
of substantive statutory rights, ban class actions, and force people to arbitrate their claims
hundreds of miles from their homes." Id.
128 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, supra note 127. See also Jill I. Gross, The End
of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REv. 1174, 1176 (2010) (noting that
these categories are defined broadly in order to ensure maximum invalidation of
mandatory arbitration provisions).
129 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, supra note 127.
130 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)
("[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself-an issue which
goes to the 'making' of the agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to
adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider
claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.").
131 Id.
132 See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2780 (2010)
(emphasis added) (dictating that the arbitrator has the power to decide challenges to
enforceability of arbitration agreements-not the court-unless the challenge is directed
to the delegation clause itself). See also Annual Review, supra note 1, at 232.
760
[Vol. 28:3 2013]
IN A BIND
Rather, only an objection made to the delegation provision itself is
reviewable by a court. 133
The future of the AFA is unknown. Although its origins lie in
congressional disapproval of arbitration agreements within consumer
contracts, if passed, it may have a spill-over effect on such arbitration
provisions used by corporations in different contexts, such as the shareholder
derivative context. Either way, the proposed bill is raising awareness of
congressional disapproval of the FAA as it currently stands.
2. Uncertain Status ofSecurities Arbitration
Another challenge to the FAA is the fluctuating status of securities
arbitration. "Securities arbitration" refers to the arbitration of disputes
between investors and their individual brokers and other disputes between
securities industry parties.134 Although arbitration has been the primary
mechanism for resolving securities disputes for over twenty years,135 these
disputes are now arbitrated within the dispute resolution forum of the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). 136 FINRA, a non-
governmental regulatory organization for U.S. securities brokers and dealers
formed in 2007 by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
and the NYSE, houses the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities
industry.137 Arbitration is normally mandatory in securities disputes, and
133 Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2780. In Rent-A-Center, the Court was asked to
enforce the delegation provision of an arbitration agreement binding an employer from
suing his employer in court. Id. at 2775. The Court enforced the delegation provision
under § 2 of the FAA but deemed such a provision severable from the entire arbitration
agreement, the validity of which was to be determined by an arbitrator as a whole. Id. at
2779.
134 Gross, supra note 128, at 1177.
135 Id. at 1179.
136 A FINRA member is defined as an entity "who is registered or has applied for
registration under the Rules of FINRA" or "[a] sole proprietor, partner, officer, director,
or branch manager of a member, or other natural person occupying a similar status or
performing similar functions, or a natural person engaged in the investment banking or
securities business who is directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by a member,
whether or not any such person is registered or exempt from registration with FINRA."
N. Kane Bennett, Navigating FINRA's Mandatory Arbitration Requirement-An
Overview, CONNECTICUT BUSINESS LITIGATION BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://www.connecticutbusinesslitigation.com/2011/03/articles/commercial-
litigation/navigating-finras-mandatory-arbitration-requirement-an-overview/ (citing
FINRA Manual Rule 13100(r)).
137 News Release, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, NASD and NYSE
Member Regulation Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority-
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allows only "limited grounds on which a court may hear a party's appeal on
an award." 38
Despite its successes, FINRA arbitration has recently received criticisms
that may, if deemed legitimate, spill over onto the legitimacy of the FAA.
Similar to other mandatory arbitration agreements such as the one at issue in
the AT&T case, FINRA's private arbitration process has felt backlash from
consumer groups who are raising concerns that their right to sue in court has
been unconstitutionally curtailed. 139 Individual investors also have a general
negative perception of securities arbitration.140 There is a possibility that
securities disputes would be covered by the AFA provision exempting
arbitration from all "consumer disputes."'41 Thus, if the AFA is passed into
law, securities arbitration could be lost. Finally, the 2010 Dodd-Frank
reforms added to the uncertainty of the future of securities arbitration by
granting the SEC the authority to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements
in securities contracts. 142
FINRA (July 30, 2007), available at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/PO36329; Michael Smallberg, SEC
Withholds Records on Oversight of Self-Regulatory Group, PROJECT ON GOvERNMENT
OVERSIGHT BLOG (June 16, 2011, 4:52 PM),
http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2011/06/sec-withholds-records-on-oversight-of-self-
regulatory-group.html. FINRA recently announced the launch of a pilot program
designed to ease arbitration requirements for large cases based on claims of at least $10
million. The program reportedly "enables parties to customize the administrative process
to better suit special needs of a larger case and allows them to bypass certain FINRA
arbitration rules." News Release, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA
Launches Pilot Program for Large Arbitration Cases (July 2, 2012),
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2012/Pl27254.
138 FINRA, Arbitration: Decisions & Awards,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Process/DecisionAwards/inde
x.htm (also referring to the FAA). In recent news, the Second Circuit affirmed a district
court's approval of a $20.5 million FINRA arbitration award against hedge fund broker
Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing L.P. Rejecting Goldman's argument that the
arbitration award should be vacated because the award was "in manifest disregard of the
law," the court commented that "review under the manifest disregard standard .. . is
highly deferential to the arbitrators, and relief on such a claim is therefore rare." Goldman
Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P. v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Bayou
Group, LLC, 491 Fed. App'x 201, 203 (2d Cir. July 3, 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
139 Smallberg, supra note 137.
140 Gross, supra note 128, at 1185.
141 Id. at 1178-79.
142 Id. After the Dodd-Frank amendments, Section 15 the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o, now provides, "The Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or
impose conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers ... to
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Many argue that such criticisms of and threats to securities arbitration are
unfounded, as there are many benefits to investors stemming from FINRA's
arbitration program.143 Securities arbitration presents advantages to investors
similar to those offered to shareholders in derivative suit arbitration
proceedings. In fact, the climate in the SEC is reportedly changing.
Traditionally opposed to arbitration clauses on the grounds that they threaten
to dilute shareholders' and consumers' rights, the SEC has slowly become
receptive to arbitration provisions within corporate documents. 1" Moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court has displayed its approval of arbitrating disputes in
the securities context. In 1989, the Court formally overruled its decision in
Wilko v. Swan,145 a case which voided arbitration of securities claims under
the Securities Act of 1933.146 In doing so, the Court commented that "resort
arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws, the
rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if it finds
that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public interest
and for the protection of investors." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, H. R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 921 (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/dodd-frank-sec-922.pdf.
143 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 128, at 1186-90 (noting that FINRA arbitration
proceedings are overseen by the SEC to ensure fairness, facilitate access to forums for
investors, promote transparency, and contain procedural safeguards to all parties
involved). Because of the procedural safeguards provided by an administrative agency
toward arbitration proceedings, Gross argues that securities arbitration should not be
reduced to the same concerns surrounding mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer
contracts. Id. at 1194. The same argument could be made regarding the procedural
safeguards offered by Chancery Court arbitration proceedings, as discussed above. See
supra Part II.
144 Ravanides, supra note 2, at 408 ("With the SEC re-considering its defacto veto
of public arbitration, the legal argument in favor of the arbitrability of intra-corporate
controversies is almost invincible . . .. There is no reason why this national policy would
not justify the enforcement of arbitration provisions embedded in a public company's
governing documents, when arbitration is the prevalent dispute resolution mode in the
securities industry."). See also Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private
Securities Litigation: Dealing With the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1055, 1127-28 (1999) (predicting the SEC's encouragement of arbitration
clauses within registration statements). But cf Stephen Bainbridge, Is Carlyle Even Less
Shareholder Friendly Than the Green Bay Packers? Is That a Bad Thing?
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 19, 2012, 3:49 PM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbidgecom/2012/0 1/is-carlyle-even-
less-shareholder-friendly-than-the-green-bay-packers-is-that-a-bad-thing.html (noting the
SEC's "longstanding policy" of refusing to approve IPO registration statements
containing mandatory arbitration provisions).
145 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
146 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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to arbitration does not inherently undermine any of petitioners' substantive
rights under the Securities Act." 147
If arbitration of securities disputes continues to grow, and the SEC
refrains from exercising its veto right over arbitration clauses, the threat
stemming from the AFA and other consumer groups will possibly be
mitigated. Two years after the implementation of Dodd-Frank reforms, the
SEC has shown no sign of using its newfound power to curtail the
enforceability of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the
securities context. 148 Regardless, the status of such pre-dispute arbitration
agreements will unquestionably have an effect on the success of the FAA
and, in turn, similar clauses found within corporate bylaws affecting
shareholders.
B. Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
Despite threats to both the legitimacy of the FAA and the subsequent
enforceability of the mandatory arbitration provisions corporations
implement into their bylaws, there remain several fundamental arguments
toward enforceability. Firstly, there is a strong argument that arbitration
provisions should be deemed enforceable based on pure principles of
contract law.149 As previously noted,' 50 corporate bylaws are a contract that
all shareholders adhere to upon the purchase of corporate stock.' 5' It is
14 7 Id. at 486.
148 Jay Eng, Two Years & Still Waiting for the SEC to Address the Enforceability of
Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements in Customer-Broker Disputes Under
Section 921 of Dodd-Frank, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION & ARBITRATION LAW (July 16,
2012), http://securitiesattomeys.us/finra-arbitration/two-years-still-waiting-for-the-sec-to-
address-the-enforceability-of-mandatory-pre-dispute-arbitration-agreements-in-customer-
broker-disputes-under-section-921-of-dodd-frank/. To date, eighteen comments on the
Title IX provisions of Dodd-Frank have been submitted and published by the SEC. Pre-
Dispute Arbitration: Title IX and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, SEC.GOV (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/pre-
dispute-arbitration/pre-dispute-arbitration.shtml.
149 In order to enforce arbitration agreements within the corporate context, the
corporation must establish that the proceedings "have a contractual basis and that
shareholders are not deprived of the protections of litigation without contest, which
ultimately comes down to a question of notice." Dana Freyer & Robert Sayler,
Commercial Disputes, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE LITIGATOR'S
HANDBOOK 147, 166 (Nancy F. Atlas, et al. eds., 2000).
150 See supra Part III.
151 Shell, supra note 52, at 544; see also Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat'l Intergroup,
Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990) (ruling that corporate charters and bylaws are
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implicitly assumed that all parties to a contract have read and agreed to the
terms of the contract before signing it.152 The same principle holds true for a
corporation's bylaws outlining the rights of its shareholder owners, as long as
such provisions are placed within a charter at the time of a company's initial
public offering.153
Another argument for enforceability flows from DGCL § 102(b)(7),
which allows corporations to adopt charter provisions limiting director and
officer liability.154 Stephen M. Bainbridge, professor at UCLA School of
Law, suggests that because corporate law allows for corporations to freely
amend a set of default rules outlining the duties of corporate officers and the
corporate form in general, "there seems little reason not to expand the
liability limitation statutes to allow corporations to opt out of derivative
litigation." 55 Indeed, Professor Bainbridge's argument touches on the
underlying attraction of enabling Delaware law. If derivative suits are largely
viewed by corporations as stifling upon corporate management, Delaware
contracts to be governed by general rules of contract interpretation). But cf Poppe &
Sullivan, supra note 8, at 7 (suggesting that the FAA arguably may not apply to a
company's charter or bylaws because they are not a "contract" in the traditional sense, as
defined under state contract law). Indeed, possible grounds for objecting to the FAA's
applicability to corporate charters are the statute's specification of a "written provision"
as a contract. Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 5, at § 2. Some argue that corporate
bylaws are distinct from contracts made and signed between two commercial actors.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: How
the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 129
(2012). However, with its pro-arbitration stance the Supreme Court has "redefined the
meaning of contracting" to encompass contracts formed and approved by shareholder
referendum. Cunningham, supra note 43.
152 Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54 at *14 (Mar. 16,
2000) ("One who knowingly accepts the benefits intended as the consideration, coming
to him or her under a contract voluntarily made by another in his or her behalf, becomes
bound by reason of such acceptance to perform his or her part of the contract.") (quoting
17B C.J.S. § 631 (1999)) (enforcing an arbitration clause within a consumer purchase
agreement).
153 Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 817 A.2d 149, 2002 Del.
LEXIS 679 at *155-56 (Nov. 4, 2002) ("When parties to an agreement decide that they
will submit their claims to arbitration, Delaware courts strive to honor the reasonable
expectations of the parties and ordinarily resolve any doubt as to arbitrability in favor of
arbitration.") (reversing lower court's enforcement of arbitration clause within corporate
bylaw because it was outside the scope of the duties and obligations under the
shareholder agreement).
154 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 81, at 404.
155 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 81, at 404 ("If eliminating derivative litigation seems
too extreme, why not allow firms to opt out of the derivative suit process by charter
amendment?").
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should serve as the example to other jurisdictions by allowing corporations to
include in their bylaws mandatory arbitration provisions for reasons of
efficiency. The underlying principle of § 102(b)(7) applies: just as the fear of
being sued for gross negligence and violating the duty of care can stifle
potential profit-maximizing risk-taking by boards of directors, constant
litigation of shareholder derivative suits can do the same. If corporations are
allowed to limit director liability under § 102(b)(7), they should be able to
limit the forum in which shareholder disputes are resolved.
1. Forum Selection Clauses and DGCL § 102(b) (1)
Furthermore, many argue that mandatory arbitration provisions should
receive the same attitude of deference by Delaware courts as have been given
exclusive jurisdiction provisions within corporate bylaws. An exclusive
jurisdiction provision (also known as a forum selection provision) allows
corporations to select in advance the jurisdiction in which shareholder
disputes will be held (normally in the state of incorporation). 156 Such a
clause normally provides:
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative
forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and
exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on
behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a
fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or other employee of the
Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation's stockholders, (iii) any
action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by
the internal affairs doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise
acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock of the Corporation shall be
deemed to have notice of and consented to the provisions of this Article. 157
Such provisions are implemented by corporations to address the problem
of multijurisdictional shareholder litigation by channeling all suits into one
156 Steven M. Davidoff, A Litigation Plan That Would Favor Delaware, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBK (Oct. 26, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/a-
litigation-plan-that-would-favor-delaware/.
157 Broc Romanek, Coordinated Attack on Exclusive Forum Bylaw Provisions,
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET (Feb. 9, 2012),
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/2012/02/coordinated-attack-on-exclusive-
forum.html (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction-usually Delaware. 158 Forum selection clauses can be phrased in
one of two ways: either mandatory or elective.159 A mandatory forum
selection provision requires that all shareholder litigation will occur in the
jurisdiction of incorporation or a specific state, e.g. Delaware.160 An elective
forum selection provision gives the corporation the option to elect that all
shareholder litigation will take place in the jurisdiction of incorporation.161
Forum selection provisions within corporate charters have been upheld
by the Delaware Courts as being within the directors' authority outlined
under DGCL § 102(b)(1).1 62 In its 2010 decision In re Revlon, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court held that forum
selection clauses are enforceable.163 Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge notes,
"[T]here's no immediately obvious policy reason why the same result would
not apply to mandatory arbitration provisions." 64
158 Alison Frankel, El Paso Case Shapes Up as Latest M&A Shareholder Venue
Fight, THOMSON REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Lega/News/20 11/10 -
_October/ElPaso caseshapesup aslatestMA shareholder venue fight/.
159 Davidoff, supra note 156. Davidoff suggests that corporations would be wise to
put such provisions to a shareholder vote, in order to address any objections based on the
grounds of corporate governance. If shareholders vote to adopt these provisions, there is a
greater likelihood they would pass through judicial scrutiny. Davidoff, supra note 156.
Arguably, this flexibility to choose between mandatory and elective language of a forum
selection clause could also be applied to arbitration clauses; an elective arbitration clause
could give the corporation the option of bringing a derivative claim in a judicial forum or
submit it to arbitration. Furthermore, like forum selection clauses, a corporation always
has the choice to submit mandatory or elective arbitration clauses to a shareholder vote in
a charter amendment, although the likelihood of approval is less certain in the derivative
context.
160 Id.
161 Id
162 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2006) (allowing certificates of incorporation
to contain "[a]ny provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the
affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating
the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of the
stockholders ... if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State.").
163 In re Revlon, 990 A.2d at 960. Since the Revlon opinion was adopted, twenty-
three companies have adopted similar forum selection clauses in their charters. Davidoff,
supra note 156.
164 Bainbridge, supra note 144. Professor Steven M. Davidoff further notes that,
given the Chancery Court's recent endorsement of forum selection clauses in Revlon and
the fact that such clauses arguably satisfy DGCL § 109's requirement that corporate
bylaw provisions relate to "the business of the corporation . .. and its rights or powers or
the rights or powers of its shareholders, directors, officers and employees," the Delaware
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Most notably, the Revlon court stated in dicta that arbitration clauses
within corporate bylaws are similarly encompassed within directors'
discretionary § 102(b)(1) powers, and thus would prove similarly enforceable
as forum selection provisions.165 Such provisions can have the beneficial
effects of self-selecting merited shareholder suits for resolution, and also
deterring "shirking" by frequent filers seeking to reap the profits of
attorneys' fees from a derivative suit. 166 As highlighted by the Chancery
Court, and as outlined above,167 mandatory arbitration provisions are
recognized as enforceable by courts in a variety of business entity contexts,
particularly within the LLC organization.168 Thus, it may be only a matter of
time until enforceability of those provisions is recognized for large publicly
traded corporations.
Of course, forum selection clauses have not been welcomed by corporate
constituencies with completely open arms. Forum selection provisions have
recently met resistance in a series of suits challenging forum selection
clauses requiring shareholder suits to be filed within the Delaware Court of
Legislature may consider amending its corporate law rules to explicitly allow forum
selection clauses. Davidoff, supra note 156.
165 In re Revlon, Inc., 990 A.2d at 960 (stating that "if boards of directors and
stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and value-
promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter
provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes."); see also id. at n.8,
where Vice Chancellor Laster further predicted that "[t]he issues implicated by an
exclusive forum selection provision must await resolution in an appropriate case."
166 In re Revlon, Inc., 990 A.2d at 961 (noting that such forum selection provisions
will have the long-term beneficial effect of enhancing the legitimacy of Delaware
corporate law). See also Joseph A. Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-
Corporate Litigation: Mandatory and Elective Approaches, The 2010 Pileggi Lecture,
Oct. 6, 2010, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1690561
("It is important to distinguish profit maximizing conduct by plaintiff counsel from
welfare maximizing behavior in shareholders' best interests. The two concepts are not
identical.").
167 See supra Part III.A.
168 See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am. Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999)
(validating an LLC's contractual provision requiring that all disputes be resolved by
arbitration or court proceedings in California); Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc.,
888 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2006) (declaring an arbitration clause within an LLC
charter enforceable pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c)(2)). Noting
Delaware's favorable attitude toward enforceability of arbitration provisions, the
Chancery Court in Douzinas reiterated that "a broad arbitration provision in an LLC
Agreement could encompass breach of fiduciary duties claims raised by a member." Id.
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Chancery.169 Shareholders are alleging that these provisions violate their due
process rights because they were not subject to mutual consent by the
shareholders.1 70 The law firms suing on behalf of the shareholders reportedly
find merit in contesting these provisions due to recurring patterns of
corporations attempting to limit shareholder rights.171 By filing these suits,
firms are not arguing that Delaware is an inappropriate venue; rather, they
seek a final ruling on whether the practice of using corporate bylaws to
specify a forum for shareholder suits is contrary to Delaware law in the first
place.172
The enforceability of forum selection clauses is yet to be determined, but
due to the pending litigation on the topic, the wait will probably not be long.
Given the trend of corporations adopting these provisions, the arguments
toward their enforceability, and the preference to keep corporate law within
the province of the Delaware judiciary,173 these clauses will likely be deemed
enforceable. Moreover, if mandatory arbitration provisions fall within the
purview of forum selection clauses, any decisions made regarding the
validity of the latter could potentially affect the validity of the former.174
VI. CONCLUSION
Corporate management's frustration toward shareholder derivative suits
has finally come to fruition. Mandatory arbitration clauses seek to eliminate
169 Francis Pileggi, Multiple New Suits Challenge Exclusive Forum Selection
Bylaws in Delaware Court of Chancery, DELAWARE CORPORATE & COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION BLOG (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2012/02/articles/chancery-court-updates/multiple-
new-suits-challenge-exclusive-forum-selection-bylaws-in-delaware-court-of-chancery/.
170 I
171 Alison Frankel, Shareholder Lawyers Sue Over Delaware Forum-selection
Bylaws, THOMSON REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/02 -
February/Shareholder-lawyerssue-overDelaware-forum-selection bylaws/.
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 158 ("Delaware judges typically frown upon any
litigation maneuver that compromises Delaware's authority as the ultimate arbiter of
commercial disputes.").
174 For instance, in the forum selection clause previously noted, see supra Part V,
the phrase "[u]nless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative
forum" could also apply to an arbitration tribunal. If such a forum selection clause is
deemed by the judiciary to be enforceable, a clause which submits shareholder suits to
arbitration proceedings may likely be treated the same.
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the recurring drawbacks that meritless strike suits have on corporate
management and the Delaware judiciary. Although such provisions have not
gone without critique, their increasing popularity foreshadows a changing
tide in forum selection for the traditional shareholder complaint. If
corporations are successful in implementing arbitration provisions within
their bylaws, either upon incorporation or by shareholder-approved charter
amendment,175 arbitration tribunals are sure to become increasingly popular
in Delaware.
770
175 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (entitling shareholders to vote on proposed
amendments to a corporate charter). See also Shell, supra note 52, at 550 ("An arbitration
provision will not be in place unless it was contained in the original charter or adopted as
a charter amendment by a vote of the shareholders.").
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